I - The Nature of the Laws of Nature
There are three sorts of Law which constrain the universe. The Material Law, the Logical Law, and the Moral Law. These Laws can be identified by their characteristics: Robustness, Fragility, Discernability, Verifiability, Artificiality, Necessity, and Mutability. A Robust constraint is a constraint that cannot be transgressed within the system it constrains. A Fragile constraint is a constraint that can be transgressed within the system it constrains. A Discernable constraint is a constraint that can be discerned of itself within the system it constrains. A Verifiable constraint is a constraint that can be discerned in an external manner, such as experimentation or observation, but not through reason alone. An Artificial constraint is a constraint that is imposed upon the system it constrains, but does not bind the constrainer. A Necessary constraint is a constraint that is imposed upon the system it constrains as a necessary consequence of something which constrains the constrainer. A Mutable constraint is a constraint that can be changed by its constrainer.
The Material Law, which corresponds to the natural sciences, is Robust, which means that it cannot possibly be broken by anything which is subject to it. Things that may seem to break the Material Law, such as black holes, rather expose a deficient understanding of the Material Law, rather than a deficiency of the Law itself. The Material Law is Discernable and Verifiable, meaning that it can be deduced by reasoned observation and experimentation, but not entirely using the internal senses. The Material Law can be tested and proven in an external manner. The Material Law is Artificial, meaning that, if one supposes the existence of a god or gods, he or they needn’t be subject to the Material Law, and are free to contradict it. The Material Law is also Mutable under the same circumstances, where, if there is a god or gods, the Material Law is subject to change by those same entities.
The Logical Law, which corresponds roughly to the fields of philosophy and mathematics, is also Robust. The Law of Non-Contradiction, for instance, cannot conceivably be violated. One cannot equal one plus one. A “square circle” is a purely linguistic construction, with no conceptual or logical essence, and cannot possibly exist, or even be described. The Logical Law is Discernable, but is not Verifiable. It can be deduced in some objective sense by an intelligent person, but only through the internal abilities of reason, and cannot be externally verified in an observable manner.1 The Logical Law is Necessary, meaning that, if one supposes the existence of a creator god,2 the Logical Law must flow from the nature of that god in such a sense that such a god could or would not have been able to establish a different Logical Law.3 The Logical Law is Immutable, meaning that it cannot change.4
The Moral Law has to do with right and wrong. It is Fragile, meaning that it can be transgressed. It is neither Discernable nor Verifiable, meaning that it cannot be ascertained by observation, experimentation, or pure reason. It is Necessary, meaning that it must flow from the nature of its Creator in a like manner to the Logical Law. It is also Immutable, meaning that it cannot change; what is moral one day must be moral the next, and what is immoral one day must be immoral the next.
The Fragility and Indiscernibility of the Moral Law sets it apart from the other Laws of the universe. Consider the Mad Philosopher; an immortal wise man of incredible learning, flawless reasoning ability, and the ability to observe and remember all natural phenomena (such as are visible to a natural man without supernatural enlightenment), and unlimited resources for testing, yet unaware of the True God. Such a man could, on his own, discover and establish all possible Material and Logical truths. Yet if he sought to establish Moral truths, he would be dismayed. There would be no experiment he could design which would prove the moral correctness of an action, no syllogism that could clearly establish depravity without unsubstantiated assumptions. The Mad Philosopher could create some code of ethics based on some arbitrary criteria, such as “what is ideal for social happiness,” or “what will lead to the greatest accumulation of honor and glory,” but he could not prove that those criteria have any Moral element to them.5
II - The Philosopher and the Knave
Suppose that the Mad Philosopher proposed a brilliant ethical system which maximized social happiness, fulfillment, and honor.6 He proposed this system to the city and, convinced by his reasoning and compelled by collective self-interest, accepted his ethical propositions, and crowned the Philosopher as their ruler. Under the Philosopher’s system, murder is prohibited. However, within the city is the Wise Knave, an utterly self-interested man with no empathy, yet perfect control and understanding of his impulses. The Knave says in his heart, “I am filled with lust for blood, and I care not for the well-being of my neighbor. Why should I not murder him, and thus satisfy myself? Why is it better for the many to be happy, fulfilled, and honorable, than for me to be satisfied?” Knowing that the Mad Philosopher is wiser than he in these matters, the Knave seeks him out and asks him these questions. The Philosopher appeals to the social good that the ethical order gives all of its members, the Knave included, but the Knave does not care. The Knave departs, unsatisfied, and murders his neighbor brutally when he returns home. Seeking justice and social good, the Philosopher orders that the Knave be cast into prison.
Years later, the Philosopher visits the Wise Knave in prison, and the Knave says to him, “Why did you not tell me that evil should become of me, should I do these acts? If I had known that I would be cast into this dark place, suffering tortures daily, I would never have plotted against my neighbor!” The Philosopher responds, saying, “This is true, nevertheless, for Justice’s sake, it is necessary that you should be subject to grievous torments as long as you live, since you shed innocent blood without cause.” Recognizing the justice of this, the Knave responds, “Then let it be so; yet I have a brother, who is like me in disposition towards his fellow man. Would that you tell him of my fate, that he should learn to fear and obey you.” The Philosopher obliges, and the Knave’s brother never once violates the ethical code, fearing the fate of the Knave. Rejoicing at this, the Philosopher ordered that all future capital criminals be crucified in the center of the city, that all would learn to fear violations of the ethical order.7
Even the Mad Philosopher could not convince, using proof, reasoning, ethical argument, or any other method, to dissuade the Wise Knave from murdering. He could not answer the Knave Question, the fundamental “Why?” that stands at the end of every ethical system. Yet, he was able to convince the Knave’s brother, who was his equal in all anti-sociality, to obey the ethical order by the threat of violence. It became apparently inconvenient to disobey the Philosopher. Due to this threat of discomfort, the ethical order was upheld, and all questions against it were silenced. It became the self-interest8 of all the Philosopher’s subjects to obey him, since the ethical order benefitted them, and they were aware of the grievous punishments upon those who violated it.9
It seems, then, that the Mad Philosopher’s judgement against murder is what distinguished, in practical terms, good from evil. It was not enough for the Philosopher to say that murder is evil, but he had to apply his might as ruler of the city against it as well. If he did not, then the judgement of “evil” against murder would be meaningless; a descriptive word without descriptive value. If the Wise Knave had not been punished, his act of murder would really have been the same as any other act by any other citizen. The Knave’s fellow citizens may have grown to hate him on interpersonal basis, but reputation is highly fallible. A law-abiding citizen of the city may become hated by his neighbors for his strange appearance or mannerisms, which do not violate the ethical code. Now, if the social isolation and hatred of his neighbors was too great to bear, it may have prevented the Knave from committing the murder, but this is really the same as the legal punishment he received.
Now suppose that an occasion of madness falls upon the Mad Philosopher, and his desires change. Still capable of perfect reason, and still ruling over the city, the Philosopher now desires to establish an ethical order which maximizes unhappiness, unfulfillment, and dishonor. Based upon these new first principles, he uses perfect reason to create an orderly society within the city that reduces its citizenry to abject debasement and depression, yet the punishments remain the same for those who violate the law of the ethical order. While it is unpleasant to live under his reign, it is more unpleasant still to rebel against the Philosopher. After a few years, a number of military men in the city, who still follow the old ethical order in their hearts, launch a mutiny against the Mad Philosopher, for the sake of their fellow citizens. The mutiny fails, and all the mutineers are crucified.
One might reckon that the mutineers were martyrs for a just cause, but how were they any different than the Wise Knave? The Knave delighted in the death of his neighbor, and the mutineer delighted in his happiness, yet both of these were self-interested, and were against the ethical code of the city. The mutineers were not “right,” in any objective sense, and neither was the Mad Philosopher “wrong.” All acted, relative to themselves, with identical motivations. In the subjective sense, relative to the city and its ethical order, the Philosopher was justified, and the mutineers were evil.
III - Answering the Knave Question
However, suppose that the Mad Philosopher’s city is merely one part of a larger kingdom. Its ruler, the Kind Prince, is also wise and learned, even as the Philosopher is wise and learned, and is mightier than he in terms of manpower and resources. One day, the Kind Prince sends a surveyor to the Philosopher’s city, who reports back the dreadful state of affairs. The Kind Prince is appalled, and demands an explanation from the Philosopher. The Philosopher sends a messenger who explains that the city is designed to maximize unhappiness, unfulfillment, and dishonor, and that it is doing so to the utmost. The Kind Prince has the messenger executed immediately and moves his armies to attack the city. His superior might overcomes the hosts of the Philosopher, who is forced to surrender. The Kind Prince crucifies the Philosopher and all his supporters in the center of the town, but shows mercy on, and rewards, those who opposed him. The Kind Prince also declares that the mutineers acted in loyalty to him, and were heroes of the kingdom.
Where the Mad Philosopher was justified by his might, the greater might of the Kind Prince found him guilty, and overthrew him. “Right versus wrong” are secondary to “mighty versus weak.” In the practical sense, the Kind Prince’s subjective moral values, which became the new ethical order, were superior to that of the Philosopher, not by any objective method, but because he had the power to enforce them. The mutineers, who had died painful deaths as traitors, became valiant heroes of the Kind Prince’s justice, not because of their own strength, but because the strength of the Kind Prince vindicated their cause.
One might imagine that an empire invades the kingdom, overthrowing it and its values, only to be itself overthrown by a stronger empire, and so on up the line of might until its conclusion is reached: the One that none is stronger than, God.
God is like the Mad Philosopher, in that he knows all truths, and has absolute authority over all the goings-on of His domain, but is unlike him in that He is Immutable, not subject to fits of madness and changes of mind. God is like the Kind Prince in that he overthrows those (such a the Devil) who disobey him with His superior strength, and vindicates those righteous who obeyed Him even unto their death and shame, but is unlike the Kind Prince in that He cannot Himself be overthrown; the buck stops with Him.
Nothing is too difficult for God. God’s omnipotence is such that He is capable of expressing the fullness of His Might upon all beings, without any spatial or temporal constraint. God has certain moral values that are essential to His Being; it is His Will that mercy be good, that mercilessness be evil, that marriage be good, that adultery be evil. Just as the Mad Philosopher judged that it was necessary for the Knave to suffer for his crime, God has judged that all sinners must be damned for their sin. Who is powerful enough to question Him? The Moral Law of God, which is not discerned but revealed,10 is “subjective” in such a transcendent manner as to be functionally identical to objectivity. If God did not ultimately stand in judgement of all mankind, His Law would be basically irrelevant—what would be the difference between the righteous and unrighteous man? Divine fiat, as a moral system, actually escapes the pitfalls of other might-enforced moralisms due to the transcendent nature of God’s All-Might.
One foolhardy man may shake his fist at God, contending that His judgements are, essentially, arbitrary. But so what if they are? Is the scoffer powerful enough to contend against the LORD? There is none stronger, so who else could declare right and wrong? Who should? God’s judgements are arbitrary, in the sense that they are not based on any other standard beyond God’s own Will, but in that way they are not of a different type than any other moral judgement, or law, made by men; except that God alone has the authority to make such a Law.
The conclusion of the matter is this: Might does, in fact, make right. Nothing prevents a strong man from enforcing his will upon a society, and, if he is able to stop the voices of dissenters with his violence, he will known to be good by those under him. Morality is derivative of Might, and is a product of hierarchy. The ruler of a city decides what good and evil are in that city, except that both he and his subjects are immediately subject to God, and to pit ones morals against the greater Morality is to pit ones might against the greater Might. If there were no God,11 none could stand in judgement of an independent sovereign, except by military overthrow and sheer will. Yet, since there is a God, all rulers are subject to His Authority, and stand to face judgement in this life and the next if they do not obey His Moral Law.
Verification is distinct from demonstration.
A single creator entity or event is necessary for the necessity of the Logical Law to be expressed with any sense whatsoever. Under a polytheistic scheme, such an entity may have created other entities which are called gods, but are not “gods” in the sense that they do not act as constrainers to the Logical Law.
This is difficult to prove, and I will leave it to others, more learned than I, to do so, since the nature of the Logical Law is not my intended focus in this piece of writing.
Averroes once said that if a person denies the Law of Non-Contradiction, he should be beaten until he recognizes that there is a difference between being beaten and not being beaten. I add to this that, if a person denies the Immutability of the Logical Law, he should be beaten until he acknowledges that it is inconceivable for there to be no difference between being beaten and not being beaten.
The reader is invited to try to establish a single objective moral principle without Divine revelation or circular reasoning.
Supposing, for now, that these things have objective meaning.
The point is not that the Mad Philosopher is correct in all of his judgements (if he were, he would have warned the Wise Knave of the punishment and prevented the murder), or even that his ethical order is correct (it cannot be, absent the True God), but that he behaves in a perfectly reasonable manner, given his priorities.
Note that it is equally indiscernible that to say that self-interest is inherently good, bad, or neutral, as to say collective happiness is inherently good, bad, or neutral.
The Mad Philosopher has, by this time, essentially established a fascist state.
The Law being written on the hearts of the Gentiles is a form of revelation
If there were no God, nothing could exist, and everything would be incoherent; imagine for a moment that this is not the case.